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UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISORS:
ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE CO.
For most purposes, the rights and duties of supervisory personnel
are firmly established by the exclusion of supervisors from the National
Labor Relations Act's definition of "employee." 1 As a result of this
exclusion, supervisors are denied the rights to organize and bargain col-
lectively; they are not, however, prohibited from being members of
labor organizations. 2 The failure of the Act specifically to define the
relationship between a union and its supervisor/members has given
rise to dispute in recent years. Although recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have clarified the general right of a union to discipline recalcitrant
members,3 the extent of the union's right to discipline members who also
are supervisors has been obfuscated by a failure of the National Labor
Relations Board and the courts to employ clear standards and analysis.
Section 8(b) (1) (B) of the Act has been interpreted to restrict the
right of a union to discipline supervisors. However, the NLRB and the
courts have failed to resolve conflicting policy considerations raised by
the provision, and confusion has resulted in its application. This con-
fusion became apparent in the recent decision of a panel of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Local 134, IBEW v.
NLRB (Illinois Bell) , where a supervisor/member was fined by his
union for crossing an authorized picket line at the request of his em-
ployer to perform rank-and-file work during a strike.
Before considering the permissible scope of union discipline of super-
visor/members, it is necessary to examine the position of supervisors
under the N.L.R.A. and the scope of a union's right to compel its
members to obey its rules. An understanding of the fundamental policy
1. The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), comprise the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141-88 (1970).
Under section 2(3), the "term 'employee' shall include any employee . . . but shall not
include any individual employed as . . . a supervisor . " 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1970).
See notes 14-30 infra & accompanying text.
2. The Act expressly permits a supervisor to be a union member. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970). However, such right is at the sufferance of the employer. See notes 18-20 infra &
accompanying text.
3. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB3 v. Industrial Union of Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967); cf. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 93 S. Ct. 385 (1972).
4. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (69 CCH Lab. Cas.) 13,017 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 22, 1972),




considerations embodied in each of these areas is essential to an exami-
nation of the circumstances in which these policies appear to conflict.
THE POSITION OF SUPERVISORS UNDER THE N.L.R.A.
Determination of Supervisory Status
Section 2 (11) of the Act defines supervisor as "any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the fore-
going the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 1 The
various types of authority set forth in section 2(11) are applicable in
the disjunctive; therefore, an individual possessing power to undertake
one or more such actions using his independent judgment will be found
to be a supervisor.6 The requirement of independent judgment must be
read in conjunction with the specific authorities; thus, an employee who
possesses authority to use independent judgment with respect to his
work yet lacks authority as defined by section 2(11) is not a super-
visor.7 Furthermore, it is the existence of supervisory authority and not
the exercise thereof which is determinative of supervisory status.8 Thus,
the fact that an individual spends a substantial portion of his time per-
forming rank-and-file work will not deprive him of supervisory status
as long as he possesses one or more of the specified powers.f
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). Legislative history indicates a congressional intent to
distinguish "straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees"
from individuals vested with "genuine management prerogatives" See S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), in I LEisrAm HISTORY OF Tm LABOR MArAGEmE= RLA-
TIoNs Acr, 1947, at 410 (NLRB 1948) [hereinafter cited as LmIsIAT HsroRY]; NLRB
v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293, 296 (1st Cir. 1952).
6. See, e.g., Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Howard Johnson Co., 398 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1968); Ohio Power Co. v.
NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949); NLRB v. Edward G.
Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949).
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co, 169 F2d 331 (1st Cir. 1948).
8. See, e.g., Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1952); Ohio Power
Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kolpin Bros., 379 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Fullerton
Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1960); American Cable & Radio Corp., 121 N.L.R.B.
258, 42 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1958).
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There is "of necessity a large measure of informed discretion" in-
volved in the determination of supervisory status by the National Labor
Relations Board;10 as a result, the courts have placed considerable
weight on the Board's expertise when applying the substantial evidence
test." In determining supervisory status, the Board has found it neces-
sary to go beyond the statutory definition. Thus, the ratio of super-
visors to employees may be a relevant factor.12 Other considerations may
include the fact that the individual receives a higher rate of pay than
other employees and that he is regarded by other employees as a
",boss.", 18
Purpose of Exclusion
In 1947, the Supreme Court held in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB14
that in the absence of specific limitation on the definition of "employee"
in the Act, the Board had the power to determine that an organization
of supervisors was an appropriate bargaining unit. Congress reacted
immediately by specifically excluding supervisors from the definition
of "employee." 15 Legislative history of section 2(3) reveals a decided
belief that an employer is entitled to the "undivided loyalty" of his
supervisory personnel and that the existence of foremen's unions would
be detrimental to such loyalty.16 Typical of the judicial interpretation
of congressional intent was this statement by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit:
10. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563 (1st Cir. 1961).
11. See, e.g, NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1970), aff'd on
other grounds, 401 U.S. 137 (1971); NLRB v. Corral Sportswear Co., 383 F.2d 961 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 995 (1968); NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561 (1st
Cir. 1961).
12. See, e.g, Commercial Fleet Wash, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 77 L.R.R.M. 1156
(1971); Cole Instrument Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 348, 21 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1947).
13. See, e.g., Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 904, 22 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1948).
14. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). Prior to this decision the Board had reversed itself on several
occasions on the question of coverage of supervisors under the Act and their right to
be included in bargaining units. See Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 10
L.R.R.M. 140 (1942) (supervisors' union appropriate bargaining unit); Maryland Dry-
dock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 12 L.R.R.M. 126 (1943) (unit comprised of supervisors not
appropriate); Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 L.R.R.M. 43 (1945) (supervisors'
union appropriate bargaining unit).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970); see note 1 supra.
16. 'The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors
... is inconsistent with our policy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as
workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in the plants, but when the foremen union-
ize, even in a union that claims to be 'independent' of the union of the rank and file,
they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of
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The sponsors [of the provision] feared that unionization of fore-
men and similar personnel would tend to break down industrial
discipline by blurring the traditional distinction between manage-
ment and labor. It was felt necessary to deny foremen and other
supervisory personnel the right of collective bargaining in order
to preserve their unqualified loyalty to the interests of their em-
ployers, and to prevent the dilution of this loyalty by giving them
common interests with the men they were hired to supervise and
direct.17
Effects of Exclusion
While section 14(a) provides that supervisors are not prohibited by
the Act from being members of a labor organization,' 8 an employer
may refuse to hire union members as supervisors, 19 and he may discharge
a supervisor for engaging in union activities.20 A limitation on the em-
ployer's "free hand" with respect to its supervisors applies when the
discharge of a supervisor is found to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their protected rights.2' Thus, an employer
may lawfully discharge supervisors for concerted activities on their
own behalf or on behalf of a rank-and-file union,22 including a refusal
their bossing the rank and file, the rank and file bosses them." H. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), in I LmisLA=VE HISToRY, supra note 5, at 305.
"It is natural to expect that unless this Congress takes action, management will be
deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1947), in I LEGISLA=TIV HISTORY, supra note 5, at 411 (emphasis supplied).
17. International Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir.
1964).
18. "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970).
'19. It has been held an unfair labor practice for a union to bargain to impasse over
the unionization of supervisors. Typographical Local 38 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1960), aff'd by equally divided court, 365 U.S. 705 (1961).
20. NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 908 (1949).
"Congress was aware of the potential conflict between the obligations of foremen as
representatives of their employers, on the one hand, and as union members, on the
other. Section 2(3) evidences its intent to make the obligations to the employer para-
mount.... Its purpose was to give the employer a free hand to discharge foremen as
a means of ensuring their undivided loyalty, in spite of any union obligations." Car-
penters' Dist. Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dictum) (emphasis
supplied).
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Big Three Welding Equip. Co., 359 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Inter-City
Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 908 (1952).
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to perform rank-and-fie work during a strike.23 However, it is unlaw-
ful to discharge a supervisor for testifying adversely to the employer in
a Board proceeding,24 for refusing to interfere with the organization of
a rank-and-file union,s or for refusing to participate in other unlawful
activity as demanded by the employer; 26 in such cases, the Board has
ordered reinstatement with back pay.
An employer has no obligation under the Act to bargain with or on
behalf of its supervisors.28 Certification by the Board as an appropriate
bargaining unit of a group later found to contain supervisors is invalid,
and an employer has no duty to bargain with such a group.- However,
an employer may voluntarily recognize supervisory personnel as "em-
ployees" for the purpose of collective bargaining and may include them
in the resulting contract.8 0
Participation of Supervisor/Members in Union Affairs
Although supervisors may, at the sufferance of their employer,
be union members,8' their right to participate in union affairs is
strictly limited by provisions of the Act making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the forma-
tion or administration of a labor organization.32 Since a supervisor can
23. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1952); Albrecht v. NLRB,
181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950).
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 864 (1957); cf. NLRB v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co, 389 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1969)
(unlawful to discharge supervisor for giving statement to Board agent admitting unfair
labor practice).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
26. Compare NLRB v. Lowe, 406 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1969) (discharge for refusal to
spy on union activities, unlawful), with Southwest Shoe Exch. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 247,
49 L.R.R.M. 1759 (1962) (discharge for refusal to engage in permissible dissuasion of
employees from supporting union, lawful).
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836, 837 n.2 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957).
28. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activ-
ities. . ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis supplied). Section 14(a) of the amended
Act specifically provides: "[N]o employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled
to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any
law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining." Id. § 164(a).
29. See, e.g., Warner Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1966).
30. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 330 v. Lake Hills Drug Co., 255 F. Supp. 910 (W.D.
Wash. 1964).
31. See notes 18-20 supra & accompanying text.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
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be regarded as an agent of the employer, any active participation of
supervisors in union affairs may be deemed employer interference with
the rights of "employees." 3' Thus, it has been held that a supervisor/
member may not vote in union elections34 or hold union office,35 much
less act as a bargaining agent for the union.s As a result, section 14(a)
must be read to permit supervisors to have only nominal nonpartici-
pating membership in a union. Nevertheless, union membership may
be of great value to a supervisor-it enables him to retain his fringe
benefits and to protect his seniority rights in the event he later returns
to the rank-and-file 3 I
The exclusion of supervisors by the Taft-Hartley Act has placed
them unequivocally on the side of management in the general scheme
of labor-management relations. Having described the pro forma re-
lation of the supervisor with respect to the employer and the union,
it is appropriate to frame a question which will become essential in later
discussion: If an employer is entitled to keep his supervisors out of the
union but nevertheless acquiesces in their membership, has he thereby
waived his right to the undivided loyalty of such supervisors, and, if so,
to what extent? Before considering this question, it is necessary to ex-
amine several recent Supreme Court decisions which have delineated the
right of a union to demand the loyalty of its members.
33. An employer is responsible for the conduct of its supervisors within the scope
of their general authority. See, e.g., HJ. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 US. 514 (1941); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,
185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); NLRB v. La Salle
Steel Co, 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950). Section 2(13)
of the Act provides that in determining agency, actual authorization or subsequent rati-
fication of specific acts shall not be controlling. 29 U.S.C. S 152(13) (1970). Thus, the
fact that the employer has neither authorized nor encouraged his supervisors to partici-
pate in union affairs is not a defense to a charge of illegal interference. See, e.g., Bott-
field-Refractories Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 188, 45 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1960).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Employing Bricklayers Ass'n, 292 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1961).
35. See, e.g., Plumbers Local 636 v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
36. See, e.g., id.; cf. Cox Market Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1, 60 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1965) (super-
visor's participation on employee committee formed to influence union negotiations is
unlawful interference).
37. A court of appeals has approved the Board's policy of determining on a case-by-
case basis the permissible degree of supervisor union participation in industries such as
construction where there is extreme flexibility in job positions. Factors to be con-
sidered are the nature of the supervisory position, the extent to which the holder is
identified with management, the apparent permanency of the position, and the extent to
which that position is properly included or excluded from the bargaining unit. Plumb-
ers Local 636 v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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THE LAW AND POLICY OF UNION DISCIPLINE
A basic premise of federal labor policy is that the pooling of economic
strength through combination in labor organizations increases the ability
of employees to bargain effectively for improvements in wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment. As with most organizations,
loyalty of members to organizational goals will be a prime determinant
of a union's effectiveness. The union must have available to it means
of disciplining those who threaten to detract from that effectiveness;
however, such means must be applied with caution. "Discipline of
individual members is essential if a union is to survive as an effective
organization, but discipline may also be a ready tool of oppression
within the union. There is a twilight zone between these two . . .
rather than a clear line of demarcation." 9'
In exploring the interests of the union in disciplining its members, it
is necessary to recognize that under the collective bargaining system as
envisioned by Congress and administered by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the interests of the individual necessarily are subordinated
to the interests of the collective bargaining unit as a whole.89 Moreover,
it is imperative to realize that in order to accomplish its statutory duty of
representing bargaining unit employees, the union must be able to
present a united front in its activities.
Fundamental to the law of union discipline is the decision of the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,40 where
a union fined employee/members who had crossed a picket line during
an authorized strike. After the union brought suit to collect the fines,
an unfair labor practice complaint was filed by the employer charging
the union with violating section 8(b) (1) (A) 41 by restraining and co-
ercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 right to refrain from
concerted activities.4
The Board sustained the trial examiner's dismissal of the charge,
holding that even if the union's conduct was restraint and coercion with-
in section 8 (b) (1) (A), it was protected by the proviso to that section
38. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rnv. 1049 (1951).
39. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
40. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
41. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]
." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970).
42. Section 7 provides in part: "Employees shall have the right to . . . engage
in ... concerted activities ... , and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
[Vol. 14:674
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which allows a labor union to establish its own rules pertaining to
membership.43 The Board distinguished between union discipline that
would affect the employee in his status as an employee and that which
would affect him only in his status as a union member. It was noted that
while the former is, in general, prohibited, the latter form of disci-
pline is permitted by the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A). Since the
discipline involved in Allis-Chalmers in no way affected the member's
employment rights, the Board held that the judicial enforcement of fines
imposed foK performing work during the strike was permissible. Fur-
thermore, the Board recognized that a union rule requiring a member to
refrain from working during a strike was vital to the achievement of
legitimate union objectives and was not otherwise repugnant to labor
policy.
The decision of the Board was appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. After a panel of that court had upheld the Board's
decision, the court sitting en banc reversed the Board and held that the
union had violated section 8 (b) (1) (A).4 '
The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, reversed the court of ap-
peals and affirmed the decision of the Board.4 5 Mr. Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the Court, noted that both the panel and the en banc majority of
the court of appeals had stated that a literal reading of sections 7 and
8(b) (1) (A) would require the finding of an unfair labor practice,
since crossing a picket line is within a member's section 7 right "to
refrain from concerted activity," and the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A),
read literally, sanctions no form of discipline other than expulsion from
the union. The panel in the lower court had eschewed a literal reading
of the statute, while the majority en banc had adopted it, stating: "The
statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and therefore
do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification.46 The
Court rejected the reasoning of the en banc majority and stated: "It is
highly unrealistic to regard § 8 (b) (1) [ (A) ], and particularly its words
'restrain or coerce,' as precisely and unambiguously covering the union
conduct involved in this case." 
47
43. 149 NL.R.B. 67, 57 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1964). The proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A)
states: "[Plrovided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein... " 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1) (A) (1970).
44. 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
45. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
46. 358 F.2d at 660.
47. 388 U.S. at 179.
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The Court observed that labor legislation is the product of a legis-
lative compromise of strongly held views, and that section 8 (b) (1) (A)
is only "one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act ... .,"4"
After recognizing that Congress' intent throughout the Act was to
fashion a coherent national labor policy, the Court undertook an exam-
ination of the legislative history of the section. It was concluded:
"What legislative materials there are dealing with § 8(b) (1) (A) con-
tain not a single word referring to the application of its prohibitions
to traditional union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in par-
ticular. On the contrary, there are a number of assurances by its spon-
sors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of
unions." 49
While the decision of the Court rested upon an interpretation of
"restrain or coerce" in section 8(b) (1) (A), the proviso to that section
was said to provide "cogent support" for the conclusion that the section
was not intended to prohibit the imposition of fines and attempts at
court enforcement where the discipline concerned internal union affairs.
"At the very least it can be said that the proviso preserves the rights of
unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and to impose
fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for non-
payment." r1 The Court found no indication in the legislative history
that Congress intended to treat court enforcement of fines any dif-
ferently than enforcement through expulsion, the method expressly
authorized by the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A). However, the Court
cautioned that its "conclusion that section 8(b) (1) (A) does not pro-
hibit the local's action makes it unnecessary to pass on the Board holding
that the proviso protected such action." 51
Throughout its opinion, the Court stressed the importance of a co-
herent federal labor policy. This policy requires the subordination of
the rights of the individual members of a collective bargaining unit to
control their own relations with their employer once the unit's repre-
sentative has been chosen. Thus, while an employee may disagree with
decisions of the union, he is bound by them. Stressing the importance
of the majority-rule concept in federal labor policy, the Court stated:
48. Id.
49. Id. at 185-86. Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, was not convinced by the majority's
study of the legislative history. The dissent conducted its own study of the history and
concluded that "[Wihen the legislative history is ... brief, inconclusive, and ambiguous,"
the Court should not depart from the literal language of the statute. Id. at 217.
50. Id. at 191-92.
51. Id. at 192 n.29.
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"Integral to this... policy has been the power in the chosen union to
protect against erosion [of] its status under that policy through reason-
able discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing
membership." 52 Characterizing the lawful economic strike as the "ulti-
mate weapon in labor's arsenal," " it was concluded that the power to
fine or expel strikebreakers was essential for a union effectively to per-
form its functions.M
In two subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court qualified and further
defined the scope of its decision in Allis-Chalmers. In NLRB v. I'zdus-
trial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America,55 a member
was expelled for filing unfair labor practice charges against the union
without exhausting his internal union remedies as required by the union
constitution. Thereafter, the expelled member filed another unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB. The Board held that the expulsion
violated section 8(b) (1) (A),"' but the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order.57 In an eight to one
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and affirmed the
Board. Stressing the strong policy consideration of keeping access to
the Board unimpeded, especially in those areas where public rights are
involved, the Court held that section 8(b) (1) (A) does not permit a
union to penalize a member for invoking the assistance of the very
agency created to hear complaints against unions and their officers.
Scofield v. NLRB 58 involved a union rule requiring a union member
to "bank" any incentive plan earnings exceeding a union-imposed ceil-
ing which limited such earnings per pay period. When the union dis-
covered that some of its members had requested and received full pay-
ment from the company instead of "banking" excess earnings, it fined
the members for violating the union by-laws. After the union brought
suit to collect the fines, unfair labor practice charges were filed with
52. Id. at 181.
53. Id.
54. The Court rebutted the argument that the power to expel a recalcitrant was the
only power given by the statute, noting that under such an interpretation, a weak union
would be forced to deplete its ranks to discipline its dissenting members, and that it is
for the weak union that the power to discharge its statutory function is most critical. Id.
at 183-84. Cf. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 93 S. Ct. 385 (1972) (union disci-
pline prohibited where employee/member resigns from union before crossing picket
line).
55. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
56. 159 N.L.R.B. 1065, 62 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1966).
57. 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967).
58. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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the NLRB. The Board dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint,59
and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision
of the Board. 0 In affirming the holding of the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court cited the distinction drawn in Allis-Chalmers between
union rules which primarily affect internal union affairs and those which
have an external effect on the employee's job status. The Court also
noted that Marine Workers qualified the Allis-Chalmers rule in those
instances where the union rule frustrates or conflicts with an overrid-
ing policy of the federal labor law. Conceding that the ceiling on
incentive-plan earnings had and was intended to have an effect on the
members' employment conditions, the Court nevertheless held that
where there is "a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate
union interest [and] impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the
labor laws," 'I enforcement of such rule is outside the prohibitions of
section 8 (b) (1) (A).
By interpreting the words "restrain or coerce" in section 8 (b) (1) (A)
in a manner which allows court enforcement of a reasonable fine im-
posed for conduct relating primarily to internal union affairs, the Su-
preme Court has given support to a policy of permitting a union to
present a unified front in a lawful strike situation. Acting upon the
premise that federal labor legislation vests in the chosen representative
the power to act in the interest of all employees in the bargaining unit,
the Court has recognized the union's strong interest in having its mem-
bers conform to its rules and regulations.
Bearing in mind the union's interest in maintaining the loyalty of its
members, and recalling that Congress intended to give an employer the
right to demand the undivided loyalty of its supervisors, it is now
possible to examine the situation where these two interests may conflict.
DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 8(b) (1) (B):
OAKLAND MAILERS TO MEAT CUTTERS
Restraint and coercion of an employer in the selection of his collec-
tive bargaining and grievance adjustment representatives constitutes an
unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (B) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 2 This section was designed to prohibit a union, dissatisfied with
59. 145 N.L.RJ3. 1097, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
60. 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968).
61. 394 U.S. at 430.
62. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents .. . to
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a management representative, from exerting pressure on the employer
to replace the representative with one more favorable to the union.' 3
Section 8(b) (1) (B), by its terms, protects from union interference
an employer's relation with its "representatives." It should be noted that
a "representative" within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B) often
will also be a "supervisor" within section 2 (11).6 Recent utilization
of section 8(b) (1) (B) to limit the scope of union discipline of super-
-visors is possible only where supervisors possess collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment responsibilities and thus are representatives
within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B). 5
restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1) (B) (1970).
63. See 93 CONG. REc. 3837 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft), in II L GisLATIvE HisToRY,
supra note 5, at 1012. The Senate Report on the bill noted that the section would pro-
hibit a union from coercing an employer to join or refrain from joining an employer
bargaining organization or pressuring him to remove a personnel director. S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947), in I LGIsLATnv HsToRY, supra note 5, at 427.
It is not clear what may be inferred from the deletion of the term "interfere" from
the original bill. Compare section 8(b) (1) of S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947) in
I LzoisrAm'T HistoRY, supra note 5, at 112, saitb 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
64. The statutory definition of supervisor is found in section 2(11) of the Act. See
note 5 supra & accompanying text.
65. An individual may be a representative within the meaning of section 9(b) (1) (B)
even though he has not yet exercised his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
responsibilities or even though he has not been informed that he has such responsibilities.
See Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467
(1969), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971). It is not necessary that such representa-
tives be designated in the collective bargaining agreement. Meat Cutters, Local 81, 185
N.L.R.B. No. 130, 75 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1970).
Grievances may concern disputes arising either from interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement or from personal disputes between employees. The Board has
adopted a trial examiner's conclusion that the authority to adjust either type of grievance
is sufficient to establish status as a section 8(b) (1) (B) representative. Toledo Locals
15-P & 272, Lithographers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969). See New Mexico
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 176 N.L.R.B. 797,71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d
1116 (10th Cir. 1972); Teamsters Local 287, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 74 L.R.R.M. 1354
(1970).
The fact that an individual is a supervisor with substantial authority to direct the
work of employees may give rise to the contention that he should be deemed an em-
ployer representative within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B). See, e.g., Teamsters
Local 287, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 74 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1970). The Board adopted the trial
examiner's conclusion that if an individual is a natural and logical choice for future
designation by the employer as a collective bargaining or grievance adjustment repre-
sentative, then that individual should be deemed a section 8(b) (1) (B) representative.
Since section 8(b) (1) (B) was intended to assure that an employer's selection of repre-
sentatives is free from union interference, its protection should extend to those who are
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For the first 20 years following the enactment of the Taft-Hardey
Act, section 8(b) (1) (B) was applied to proscribe only direct restraint
and coercion of employers in situations similar to those discussed by
Congress in enacting the section.6 For example, in NLRB v. Teamsters,
Local 294,67 a union expressed an unwillingness to bargain with an at-
torney employed by the company to negotiate a contract with the
union. The employer's refusal to accede to the union's demands that
the attorney be withdrawn resulted in a strike. Upholding the Board's
finding that the union had violated section 8(b) (1) (B), the court con-
cluded that "for a union to refuse to bargain with a proper represent-
ative of an employer and yet threaten a strike if bargaining does not
succeed is restraint or coercion .... ,, 08
In 1968, the NLRB substantially expanded the application of section
8(b) (1) (B) by interpreting it to prohibit indirect as well as direct
restraint and coercion of employers. In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers'
Union No. 18, foremen who possessed collective bargaining and griev-
ance adjustment responsibilities, and who were union members pursuant
to a union security clause, were disciplined by their union because of
the manner in which they interpreted the collective bargaining agree-
ment.70 After noting that Congress had intended section 8(b) (1) (B)
to protect an employer's control of its chosen representatives from in-
terference by a union, the Board found that union discipline of super-
natural and logical choices of the employer. Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers,
175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969).
There has been little if any discussion concerning the definition of a collective bar-
gaining representative. The term would appear to apply to one associated with the
process of negotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement. However,
there have been suggestions that "collective bargaining duties" encompass a far broader
range of activities. See notes 110-12 & 126-30 infra & accompanying text.
66. See note 63 supra.
67. 284 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1960).
68. 284 F.2d at 896. The court held that the lack of official designation of the union
as the exclusive bargaining representative was not a defense to a charge of violating
section 9(b) (1) (B), even though it might be a defense where violation of section
8(b) (3) is at issue.
Direct restraint and coercion under section 8(b) (1) (B) has remained a source of
litigation. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); Cheney Cal.
Lumber v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc.,
293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961); Teamsters Local 70, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 74 L.R.R.M.
1401 (1970).
69. 172 N.L.R.B, No. 252, 69 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1968).
70. It should be noted that interpretation of the contract is part of the processes of
grievance adjustment and administration of the contract, and thus part of the duties of a
representative within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B). See note 65 supra.
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visors could be as effective a restraint on the employer in the free
choice and control of its representatives as the restraint or coercion
applied directly upon the employer to replace them. "That [the union]
may have sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and
may have exerted its pressure upon the [employer] by indirect rather
than direct means, cannot alter the ultimate fact that pressure was
exerted here for the purpose of interfering with the [employer's] con-
trol over its representatives. Realistically, the Employer would have
to replace its foremen, or face de facto nonrepresentation by them."
In Oakland Mailers and subsequent cases, the Board and the courts
apparently have interpreted "restraint or coercion" as used in section
8(b) (1) (B) according to the interpretation given those words in other
sections of the Act. Under this interpretation, it is not necessary to
demonstrate that an alleged unlawful act had an actual subjective effect
on another party, so long as it may reasonably be said that the conduct
tended to interfere with the free exercise of a right of another which
is protected under the Act.72 Thus, the Board in Oakland Mailers held
that acts of the union which "were designed to change the [employer's]
representatives from persons representing the viewpoint of management
to persons responsive or subservient to [the union's] will" were illegal.73
Subsequent decisions of the Board have applied the rationale of Oak-
land Mailers to strike down discipline imposed by unions for various
actions of supervisors who possessed collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment responsibilities. The federal courts of appeals have upheld
Board decisions finding violations of sections 8 (b) (1) (B) where unions
disciplined supervisor/representatives for co-signing a letter urging em-
ployees to vote against the union in an upcoming election;74 for work-
ing for an employer which did not have a contract with the union and
which was not contributing to certain union funds;75 for performing
work prior to beginning of the regular working day;76 and for reporting
to work during a strike in crews smaller than those required by the
71. 69 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
72. See, e.g, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 51 (1954); NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219,
231 (1947); Mine Workers Local 167 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946).
78. 69 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
74. NLRB v. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972),
enforcing 176 N.LR.B. 797, 71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969).
75. NLRB v. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972),
enforcing 177 N.LR.E. 500, 71 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1969).
76. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 49,430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1970).
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collective bargaining agreement.7 7 In each of these cases, the Board
and the courts appear to have applied the rationale of Oakland Mailers
without distinguishing the relationship of the activity of the supervisors
involved in those cases from that involved in Oakland Mailers.7 8 Im-
plicit in each decision is a finding that discipline of the supervisor would
tend to result in a "substitution of attitudes," thus maling the supervisor
more responsive to union interests and less responsive to the interests of
the employer, and therefore depriving the employer of the free choice
and control of its supervisors, guaranteed by section 8(b) (1) (B).
The Board, in Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers,7 character-
ized the "apparent import of Section 8 (b) (1) (B) as a general prohibition
of a union's disciplining supervisor-members for their conduct in the
course of representing the interests of their employers." 80 The type of
conduct which is considered to be "in the course of representing an
employer's interests" was not made clear by the Board or by the courts
which summarily affirmed the decisions of the Board. The only case
suggesting a limit was Painters Local 453,1 where the Board held that
section 8(b) (1) (B) did not prohibit a union from disciplining a super-
visor for his failure to register at the office of a local before obtaining
work within that local's jurisdiction.
Meat Cutters, Local 81 v. NLRB82 was the first case in which a court
attempted to delineate the scope of conduct against which union disci-
pline is prohibited. In Meat Cutters, a grocery store manager who pos-
sessed the authority to adjust grievances (and thus was a "representative"
within the meaning of section 8 (b) (1) (B), as well as a "supervisor"
under section 2(11)) was directed by the company to cease the per-
formance of certain functions relating to the preparation of meat. These
functions thereafter were to be performed at the company's central
warehouse. Objecting to this change in policy, the union ordered the
manager, who was a union member, to continue the operations at the
retail store. When the manager failed to comply with the union direc-
tive, he was fined and subsequently expelled.
In upholding the Board's decision that the union's actions violated
section 8 (b) (1) (B), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
77. NLRB v. Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d 55 (1971), enforcing
175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969).
78. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
79. 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969).
80. Id. at 1080.
81. 183 NL.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970).
82. 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Circuit described the supervisor's conduct as an act "performed in the
course of his management duties" s1 and while "exercising his man-
agerial authority." 84 However, beyond citing Painters Local 45 3so as
presenting a situation where a union legally may discipline a supervisor/
member for acts which are not in furtherance of his obligations as the
employer's representative,"' the court failed to elucidate the standards
they invoked in determining what activities of an employer represent-
ative are immune from discipline.
Following the decision in Meat Cutters, the law in the District of
Columbia Circuit apparently was that, where a supervisor possesses col-
lective bargaining or grievance adjustment responsibilities, section 8
(b) (1) (B) prohibits a union from disciplining him for acts "performed
in the course of his management duties" or while "exercising his man-
agerial authority." However, acts of the supervisor which are "not in
the furtherance of his obligations as the employer's representative" re-
mained subject to union discipline. It was only a matter of time until the
vague standards set forth in Meat Cutters were put to a test in a fact
situation similar to that presented in Allis-Chalmers, where the Supreme
Court upheld the right of a union to discipline employee/members for
crossing a picket line.
ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE Co.
In Local 134, IBEW v. NLRB (Illinois Bell), s7 a union represented
rank-and-file employees and certain foremen pursuant to a collective
83. Id. at 796.
84. Id. at 800. The court also described the manager's activity as "performance of
duties indigenous to his position as a management representative." Id. at 798 (emphasis
supplied). It is difficult to understand how following an employer's directive concerning
a company policy could be considered part of an individual's collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment responsibilities. The court, recognizing that the application of sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (B) was limited to individuals possessing collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment responsibilities, stated that: "The rule here applied by the Board only affects
union discipline which is imposed upon a member, who has responsibilities as a repre-
sentative of his employer in administering the collective bargaining agreement or the
adjustment of employee grievances," but then continued, "because he has performed
duties as a management representative." Id. at 798-99 n.12 (emphasis supplied). The only
acceptable conclusion is that the court was employing "representative" in two different
senses. See note 65 supra.
85. 183 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970). See note 81 supra & accompanying
text.
86. 458 F.2d at 798 n.12.
87. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (69 CCH Lab. Cas.) 13,017 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 22, 1972), peti-
tion for rehearing en banc granted, Jan. 5, 1973, argued before court sitting en bane, Jan.
23, 1973.
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bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. A union
security clause was in effect; all members of the bargaining unit, includ-
ing foremen, were required to join and remain members of the union
within 30 days of commencing employment.88
In May, 1968, the union commenced an economic strike against the
employer. At the onset of the strike, the employer notified its foremen
that it desired to have them report for work during the strike, but that
each individual could decide for himself whether to work or respect
the strike. At this time, the employer indicated that those who did not
report would not be penalized.'* The union, however, warned the
foremen/members at a pre-strike meeting that if they performed rank-
and-file work, they would be subject to union discipline. 90 Neverthe-
less, several of the foremen/members reported and performed rank-and-
file work during the strike. At the conclusion of the strike, the union
instituted disciplinary proceedings against these foremen, levied fines,91
and sought enforcement in a state court. The foremen, through their
Protective Association,92 filed unfair labor practice charges with the
NLRB, alleging that the fining of supervisors for performing rank-and-
file work constituted a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (B) .9
The trial examiner determined that the foremen were both "super-
visors" within the meaning of section 2 (11),14 and "employer represent-
atives" within the meaning of section 8 (b) (1) (B)." He concluded that
the union had violated section 8(b) (1) (B) by fining the supervisor/
members for performing rank-and-file work during the strike."
88. The foremen were full members of the union. For a discussion of the validity of
the union security clause see note 96 infra.
89. The employer was true to this promise. Indeed, after the strike it promoted sev-
eral of the foremen who did not work during the strike.
90. Following this warning, several of the foremen/members formed the Bell Super-
visors Protective Association. The Association retained counsel to protect the rights of
those foremen who chose to work during the strike.
91. To the extent that any of the foremen/members paid their fines, the employer
reimbursed them.
92. See note 90 supra.
93. The Association also charged that the fining of the organizers of the Association
was a section 8(b) (1) (B) violation.
94. See notes 5-9 supra & accompanying text.
95. See note 65 supra & accompanying text.
96. On the last day of the hearings before the trial examiner, the Association moved
to amend its pleadings to conform with the evidence in order to put in issue the validity
of the union security provision in the collective bargaining agreement. The Association
argued that the provision was in violation of section 8(a) (3) (i), since it covered a
bargaining unit which included both employees and supervisors. Inasmuch as many
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The Board concurred with the trial examiner's determination,97 and
the union appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.98 A divided three-judge panel of that court upheld the Board's
decision, with Judge J. Skelley Wright filing a vigorous dissentf9 The
union's petition for rehearing was granted and the case reargued before
the court sitting en banc '°°
Because of its factual similarity to Allis-Chahners, the case is especially
appropriate for an examination of the confficting interests involved in
union discipline of supervisors. The only essential difference between
cases of union discipline of supervisors may involve such provisions, the question merits
discussion.
The Association's argument rests on a construction of section 8(a) (3), which prohibits
employer discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership. However, the
proviso to section 8(a) (3) permits union security clauses to operate so long as certain
conditions are met. One of these conditions, found in section 8(a) (3) (i), is that the
union concerned be "the representative of the employees as provided in section [9(a)]
. . . . in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (i) (1970) (emphasis supplied). The Association con-
tended that the bargaining unit here involved was not "appropriate" within the meaning
of section 8(a) (3) (i) since it included supervisors. If "appropriate" is given the same
meaning in section 9(a) (3) (i) as it has in section 9, the Association's argument would
appear to be correct, since it has been held that a unit containing supervisors is not
"appropriate" for the purposes of certification by the Board. Warner Co. v. NLRB, 365
F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1966). See notes 29-30 supra & accompanying text.
Since the Board and the court both sustained the denial of the Association's motion to
amend, the question was not faced. However, the court noted that the General Counsel
of the Board had earlier concluded that inclusion of supervisors in a unit by voluntary
agreement of the parties did not render such unit inappropriate for coverage by an
otherwise valid union security clause. In answer to the Association's contention, it could
be argued that "appropriate" is nowhere defined in the Act and that there is therefore
no reason to conclude that it must be interpreted in section 8(a) (3) in light of its use
for the purposes of Board certification under section 9.
97. 192 NJLR.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1971).
98. The Association appealed the denial of the right to amend its pleadings. See note
96 supra. The court affirmed the Board's denial of the amendment.
99. The court modified a portion of the Board's order not here relevant.
100. It is interesting to note that the union's petition for rehearing was granted with-
out the court inviting a response from the NLRB. As a matter of practice, no response
may be filed to a petition for rehearing except upon invitation of the court, but such
petition usually will not be granted until an invitation for a response has been issued.
On rehearing, the case was consolidated with NLRB v. IBEW, System Council U-4
(Florida Power and Light Co.). The facts are substantially the same as those in Illinois
Bell, except that the supervisors had joined the union voluntarily rather than pursuant
to a union security clause, and several of the supervisors adjusted grievances of and
supervised only nonbargaining unit employees. The Board had held that these facts did
not distinguish the case from Illinois Bell and relied on its decision in that case in hold-
ing that the union violated section 8(b) (1) (B) by fining the supervisors for perform-
ing struck rank-and-fie work. 193 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 78 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1971).
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the two cases is that in Illinois Bell, supervisor/members, rather than
employee/members, crossed an authorized picket line. The distinction is
important, but, as will be suggested, 101 the Supreme Court decisions
concerning union discipline of employees remain relevant in resolv-
ing section 8(b) (1) (B) cases.
Before the applicability of Allis-Chalmers and other section 8 (b) (1)
(A) cases is discussed and before an approach to the resolution of section
8(b) (1) (B) cases can be suggested, an examination of the opinions of
the panel in Illinois Bell is essential. These opinions demonstrate the
manner in which imprecise language and superficial analysis can serve
to becloud the basic issues which arise when a union disciplines a super-
visor/member.
A Profusion of Standards
The panel majority in Illinois Bell did little but add to the existing
confusion concerning the standards to be employed in reconciling the
conflicting interests involved in section 8 (b) (1) (B) cases. Indeed, the
majority introduced several new standards without defining them.
Moreover, although the dissent attempted to criticize the majority's
imprecision, much of its own language is confusing and its analysis
unclear. In an area where delicate balancing of interests is required, it
would seem apparent that the employment of clear terminology and
careful analysis is of utmost importance.
The panel majority began with an examination of the development
of section 8 (b) (1) (B). Recognizing that the statute had been inter-
preted to prohibit indirect, as well as direct restraint or coercion of an
employer in the selection of his collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment representatives,'" the court stated that this prohibition ex-
tends to "imposition of discipline upon the employer's representatives
for actions performed by them within the general scope of their
supervisory or managerial responsibilities." 103 It should be noted that
the language here employed to describe actions for which an employer
representative may not be disciplined differs from the standards em-
ployed by a different panel of the same court in Meat Cutters, where the
terms "managerial authority" and "management duties" were used. 0 4
101. See text following note 150 infra.
102. See notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
103. 4 CCH LAB L. REP. 113,017, at 25,245 (emphasis supplied).
104. See notes 83-84 supra & accompanying text.
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It may be suggested from the structure of its opinion that the majority
tacitly recognized that it was departing from the standards set forth in
Meat Cutters. The "responsibilities" language appears in the form of a
conclusion at the outset of the opinion. Later, in discussing Meat Cut-
ters, the court was careful to use the terminology employed therein,
on one occasion describing Meat Cutters as "prohibiting union disci-
pline of supervisory personnel for acts performed by them in the course
of their supervisory or managerial duties," 105 and at another point quot-
ing the "managerial authority" language of Meat Cutters.°6 After dis-
cussing earlier section 8 (b) (1) (B) cases, the court produced yet another
new standard. Citing Meat Cutters, the court propounded that the obli-
gations of supervisors to their employer supercede any obligations owed
to their union "when they are engaged in supervisory or managerial
endeavors." :o0 In explaining its decision that the International Union
had violated section 8(b) (1) (B) by upholding the fines imposed by
the local, the court asserted that the action of the union would inhibit
the performance of "supervisory or managerial functions by [the]
foremen . *..." 108 Whether the court was merely being careless with
its terminology or was camouflaging a conscious attempt to set forth
new standards to encompass the activities involved in Illinois Bell is
difficult to determine. In either case, the result of the decision is to
aggravate the existing confusion.
In applying section 8(b) (1) (B) to the facts of Illinois Bell, the court
stated that while the employer did not require its supervisors to perform
the rank-and-fie work during the strike, it had made it "very clear"
that it desired them to do so.' °9 Stressing the fact that economic pres-
sure is important to both parties as an integral part of the process of
collective bargaining, the court declared:
[W]hen supervisors' actions during an economic strike further
the interests of their employer, they are performing in a manner
which could reasonably be expected from such persons. . . .As
management representatives, supervisory personnel may be re-
105. 4 CCH LA. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,245.
106. Id. at 25,246.
107. Id. at 25,247 (emphasis supplied).
108. Id. at 25,251 (emphasis supplied). While this language of the court could easily
be misinterpreted as yet another standard for determining the acts of supervisors which
are immune from union discipline, the court was actually referring to future results
of the union discipline. Interestingly, even the dissent misinterpreted the language as
the foundation for a new standard.
109. Id. at 25,249.
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quested by management to enhance the bargaining position of
their employer during a dispute between it and the particular
union involved. . . . [S]ince [the foremen] were clearly punished
for actions undertaken by them as representatives of their Em-
ployer within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B), and in accord-
ance with the Employer's express wishes, it logically follows that
the disciplining union thereby violated section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the Act." 0
If the court was suggesting that performance of rank-and-file work
during a strike is part of the responsibility of a collective bargaining
representative, it is submitted that the court's expansive definition of a
representative's duties far exceeded reasonable bounds. The definition
of collective bargaining representative within the meaning of section
8(b) (1) (B) in other situations appears to have been interpreted nar-
rowly, and it is reasonable to suggest that a collective bargaining rep-
resentative's duties must be related to the process of negotiation or in-
terpretation of the contract.'" Clearly, the conduct of supervisors in
Illinois Bell was not related to the process of negotiation or interpre-
tation of the collective agreement. Despite this fact, the dissent failed
to criticize the majority's novel extension of the limits of a collective
bargaining representative's duties. Indeed, the dissent appears to have
adopted an equally broad concept of a representative's duties in an
attempt to distinguish a prior case." 2
If, however, the gravamen of the majority opinion is that section
8(b) (1) (B) prohibits union discipline for acts of an employer repre-
sentative performed on behalf of the employer, then it would appear
that the court is applying yet another standard, in addition to those
already mentioned, for measuring the scope of activity of an employer
representative which is immune from union discipline.
The dissent attacked the majority for condoning a "major shift in
federal labor policy" without support from the statute, legislative his-
tory, or ascertainable congressional purpose. 1 3  While characterizing
the Board decision in Oakland Mailers as having placed a "permissible
gloss" on section 8 (b) (1) (B),"4 Judge Wright demonstrated concern
with the manner in which that decision has been applied in subsequent
110. Id. at 25,249-50 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
111. See note 65 supra & accompanying text.
112. See note 130 infra & accompanying text.
113. 4 CCH LAB. L. R P. 13,017, at 25,254.
114. Id. at 25,256.
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cases. It will be recalled that Oakland Mailers involved union discipline
of a supervisor for the manner in which he interpreted and applied a
collective bargaining contract. Such activity was characterized by the
dissent as part of a supervisor's duties as a collective bargaining and
grievance adjustment representative,"i 5 while, by contrast, the activity
for which the supervisor was fined in Meat Cutters-carrying out the
employer's order relative to a new meat procurement policy-was con-
sidered to be unrelated to collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
responsibilities.""
Judge Wright, who did not participate in the Meat Cutters decision,
asserted that the panel in that case was concerned that "the Board's
Section 8(b) (1) (B) decisions might be deteriorating into a flat prohi-
bition against any union discipline of supervisors, thus giving super-
visory personnel all the benefits of union membership without having
to bear any of the responsibilities." 7 He stressed that the Meat Cut-
ters court had acted on the explicit assurance of the Board that section
8(b) (1) (B) would not be applied where the activity which caused
the employer representative to be fined was unrelated to the exercise
of supervisory or managerial authority."'
While suggesting that the panel majority purported to adhere to the
principles enunciated in Meat Cutters,"9 the dissent criticized the ma-
jority for employing terminology such as "management functions"
without anywhere defining the phrase. 20 This lack of precise defini-
tion and the manner in which the standards were applied to the facts
in Illinois Bell appeared to the dissent to impose "no limits at all on the
reach of Section 8(b) (1) (B)." 121 In order to stress the magnitude of
what he believed the majority had done, Judge Wright compared the
activity of the supervisors in Meat Cutters with that involved in Illinois
Bell. He suggested that the Board's decision in Meat Cutters was upheld
"because the supervisors were fined for engaging in usual and tradi-
115. See note 70 supra.
116. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,254.
117. Id.
118. See Brief for NLRB at 15, Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
119. The majority had cited Painters to show that their interpretation of section
8(b) (1) (B) "does not mean that a union may never discipline a supervisor/member for
breaching a valid union rule." 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,247 n.28.
120. The dissent apparently misinterpreted the majority's use of the term "manage-
ment functions." See note 108 supra.
121. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,258.
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tional management activity." 122 However, to say "that rank-and-file
labor is an ordinary management function is like saying that black is
white. The two are usually perceived as diametrical opposites ... ." 123
Apparently, Judge Wright would have preferred strict adherence to
what he characterized as the Oakland Mailers doctrine, that is, pro-
hibiting union discipline of supervisors only for acts directly related to
their collective bargaining or grievance adjustment responsibilities.
However, faced with the decision in Meat Cutters, the dissent appeared
prepared to accept a "usual and traditional management activity"
standard, but provided no guidelines for its application.
The manner in which the dissent appeared to interpret several of
the section 8(b) (1) (B) cases between Oakland Mailers and Meat
Cutters raises further questions. The dissent implied that until Meat
Cutters, the Board applied a standard prohibiting union discipline only
where supervisors were acting in their capacities as employer repre-
sentatives within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (B).' 24 However, it is
not clear that the Board and the courts were so limiting the application
of that section. 12 For example, the dissent asserted that what it had
characterized as the Oakland Mailers doctrine was applied "without
essential change" 126 in New Mexico District Council of Carpenters, 27
where a supervisor was disciplined for co-signing a letter urging em-
ployees to vote with management in an upcoming election. Judge
Wright stated that "[olbviously, it is part of a supervisor's collective
bargaining duties to urge management's viewpoint on union members.
The Board's holding in New Mexico District Council is therefore
squarely within the Oakland Mailers rule." 12s Had the dissent followed
this assertion by characterizing the performance of rank-and-file work
as not being part of a supervisor's collective bargaining duties, the at-
tempt to distinguish the case might have been tenable. Instead, the
dissent completed its distinction by stating: "It is far from obvious,
however, that a supervisor's ordinary duties include performance of
rank-and-file work" ' 29-a standard which appears to be similar to those
employed in Meat Cutters rather than the standard of Oakland Mailers.
122. Id. It would appear that the dissent has suggested yet another standard.
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 25,256.
125. See notes 74-80 supra & accompanying text.
126. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. t 13,017, at 25,256 n.5.
127. 176 N.L.R.B. 797 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
128. 4 CCH LAB. L. RE'. 13,017, at 25,257 n.9 (emphasis supplied).
129. Id. See notes 83-84 supra & accompanying text.
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Thus, two different standards were employed in distinguishing the cases.
The activity involved in New Mexico District Council (urging em-
ployees to vote with management) was said to fall within the Oakland
Mailers rule (conduct in the capacity of employer representative),
while that involved in Illinois Bell (performing struck rank-and-file
work) was argued not to fit within a standard (supervisor's ordinary du-
ties) which appears closely related to those employed in Meat Cutters.
Moreover, it is submitted that what is "obvious" to the dissent is not
at all obvious. It has been suggested that the majority was straining in
its apparent argument that performance of struck rank-and-file work is
among the responsibilities of a collective bargaining representative. 30
It is submitted that the dissent's statement that it is "obviously" within
a supervisor's collective bargaining duties to urge employees to vote
with management is an equally strained effort to distinguish New Mex-
ico District Council, a decision of the Board affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The profusion of standards by the majority and the careless analysis
of the dissent serve only to obfuscate the conflict of interests which is
presented when a union disciplines a supervisor/employer representative
for performing rank-and-file work during a strike. An analysis of the
applicability of Allis-Chalmers and other Supreme Court decisions in-
terpreting section 8(b) (1) (A) to Illinois Bell and other section 8(b)
(1) (B) cases should be helpful in suggesting the correct approach to-
ward reconciliation of the conflicting interests in the area of union
discipline of supervisors.
Applicability of Allis-Chalmers
In upholding the fining of employee/members who crossed an author-
ized union picket line, the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers recognized
strong union interests in maintaining the loyalty of its members and,
in particular, in presenting a unified front during a labor dispute. 3'
The panel majority in Illinois Bell found Allis-Chalmers "not apposite"
to questions of union discipline of supervisors, 3 2 whereas the dissent
asserted that the series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Allis-
Chalmers was controlling. 3  It is submitted that neither characterization
is entirely correct. The applicability of Allis-Chalmers to questions of
130. See notes 110-11 supra & accompanying text.
131. See notes 40-54 supra & accompanying text.
132. 4 CCH LAB. L. RaP. 13,017, at 25,248.
133. Id. at 25,259.
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union discipline of supervisors has been raised continually since the
Board's decision in Oakland Mailers. In Illinois Bell, where there is such
a close factual similarity, the question ought to be resolved.
While the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers drew "cogent support"
from the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A), it was primarily concerned
with an assessment of the language "restrain and coerce" as used in that
section.8 The proviso protects a union's right to make rules as to
acquisition or retention of membership free from the prohibitions of
section 8 (b) (1) (A). In the section 8(b) (1) (B) decisions since Oak-
land Mailers, the Board and the courts have focused on the "cogent
support" language of the Court. They have argued that since the pro-
viso is not attached to section 8 (b) (1) (B), and since the Court drew
support from the proviso for its interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A)
in Allis-Chalmers, that decision is "not apposite" to section 8 (b) (1) (B)
cases. ' n This argument overlooks the explicit statement of the Court
in Allis-Chalmers that it found it unnecessary to consider whether the
conduct in that case was protected by the proviso. 36 On the other
hand, the unions, in urging the applicability of the Supreme Court de-
cisions on union discipline of employee/members, have overlooked the
important fact that sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (1) (B) are aimed at
two entirely different relationships. Whereas section 8(b) (1) (A) seeks
to regulate the union-employee relationship, the purpose of section 8
(b) (1) (B) is to limit union interference with a right of the employer.
It is submitted that Allis-Chalmers and the subsequent Supreme Court
decisions interpreting section 8(b) (1) (A) are relevant to the question
of union discipline of supervisors and, as will be shown,18 7 can be of
use to both sides in reconciling conflicting interests in section 8(b) (1)
(B) cases. The Supreme Court disregarded the literal meaning of sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (A) and relied on policy considerations to reach results
deemed consonant with the congressional purpose. Similarly, the
134. Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DuE L.J. 1067, 1128. See notes
50-51 supra & accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,247-48.
136. 388 U.S. 175, 192 n.29. It is interesting to note that Judge MacKinnon, who wrote
the opinion of the panel majority in Illinois Bell, only a few months earlier had stated
that in Allis-Chalmers: "Instead of relying on the express language of the proviso,...
the Supreme Court carefully analyzed the entire legislative history of Section 8(b) (1)
(A), and it concluded that Congress did not intend to prohibit such internal union dis-
cipline by the prohibition against 'restraint' or 'coercion'." Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM
v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
137. See text following note 150 infra.
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NLRB has placed a "permissible gloss" on the express statutory language
of section 8(b) (1) (B) in order to fulfill what was found to have been
the congressional purpose underlying that section. It is submitted that
the proper approach in determining the extent of that "permissible gloss"
is to discard the myriad of vague standards and confusing terminology
in order to take precise aim at the relevant policy considerations, as was
done by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers.
A Suggested Approach to Resolution of the Issues
Judge Wright correctly characterized the desired result in resolving
section 8(b) (1) (B) cases: "Any sensible interpretation of the statute
must ... involve a determination of what obligations a supervisor owes
to his union and what obligations he owes to his employer." 138 More-
over, the panel majority in Illinois Bell suggested the correct approach:
"Section 8(b) (1) (B) must not be examined in a vacuum." 1' However,
utilization of this approach to reach the desired result is valid only if it
is understood why it is necessary to explore the policies expressed by
Congress in sections 2(3) and 14(a) of the Act and by the Supreme
Court in Allis-Chalmers.
Congress, in enacting section 8 (b) (1) (B), intended to prevent a
union from applying direct pressure upon an employer to interfere
with his free choice of collective bargaining and grievance adjustment
representatives. 140 There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act
to indicate that Congress ever intended that the section would be applied
to prevent indirect pressure upon an employer through union discipline
of supervisors.' 41 The congressional policy with respect to supervisors
was expressed in sections 2(3) and 14(a): Management was to have
the right to demand the undivided loyalty of its supervisors,14 but
supervisors could continue to be union members. Section 14(a) enables
an employer to obtain as supervisors individuals who might be hesitant
to forego benefits and seniority rights they have accumulated as union
members. It should be apparent to an employer that, by permitting his
supervisors to be union members, he thereby may be divesting himself
138. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,258.
139. Id. at 25,246.
140. See notes 63-68 supra & accompanying text.
141. "[T]here is not so much as a word in the legislative history of this or any other
section of the Taft-Hartley Act which indicates that § 8(b) (1) (B) was intended to ...
protect supervisors from union discipline" 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,255 n.1
(Wright, J., dissenting).
142. See notes 16-18 supra & accompanying text.
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of a degree of their loyalty to which he is otherwise entitled. In addi-
tion to the intangible effects union membership may have on a super-
visor's loyalties, the supervisor/member must be expected to incur
certain obligations to the union from which he obtains benefits.' 4"
Congress in 1947, gave no indication that a union could not discipline
a supervisor/member in order to enforce the obligations the union felt
were owed to it.
For 20 years, section 8 (b) (1) (B), as interpreted by both the Board
and the courts, was totally unrelated to sections 2(3) and 14(a). The
only situation in which a supervisor could be involved in a section 8 (b)
(1) (B) case was where the supervisor was also a collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment representative, and the union applied pressure
directly on the employer to have him replaced. It was not until-and it
is only because of-the Board's decision in Oakland Mailers that policy
considerations underlying the provisions of the Act relating to super-
visory personnel became relevant to the interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(B).
In the section 8(b) (1) (B) cases since Oakland Mailers, the Board and
courts have negated the effect of section 14(a) on the question of
union discipline of employer representatives by stressing that Congress,
in section 2(3), intended that an employer have the right to demand
the undivided loyalty of its supervisors. It is submitted that such argu-
ments are untenable. For example, the court in Meat Cutters stated:
[I]t is readily apparent, when all of the relevant 1947 amendments
to the Act are considered in concert, that Congress did not intend
(by permitting supervisors to be union members) . . . to allow
unions to subvert the "undivided loyalty" it clearly believed such
managerial personnel owe to their respective employers. A super-
visor's obligations to his union simply cannot detract from the ab-
solute duty, evidenced by section 8(b) (1) (B), which he owes to
his employer when exercising his managerial authority. M4
The first part of this statement is contradicted by the fact that Con-
gress included nothing in the Act to prohibit union discipline of super-
visor/members, and no portion of the Act has been interpreted to re-
143. However, there is nothing in the Act to prohibit an employer from discharging
a supervisor/member if the employer feels that the supervisor's loyalties have been
drawn too far toward the union's interests, unless such discharge would affect the pro-
tected rights of the employees. See notes 20-26 supra & accompanying text.
144. 458 F.2d. 794, 800 (emphasis supplied).
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strict such discipline when the supervisor is not also a collective bar-
gaining or grievance adjustment representative within the meaning of
section 8 (b) (1) (B). Furthermore, to assume this alleged intent with
respect to the obligations of supervisors and to superimpose it upon
a section of the Act designed to protect an employer's rights with re-
spect to his collective bargaining and grievance adjustment represent-
atives is a leap of faith, especially when there is no indication that Con-
gress ever considered the question of union discipline of employer rep-
resentatives.
The panel majority in Illinois Bell fell into this error when it asserted
that section 8(b) (1) (B) must be interpreted "in conjunction with the
other 1947 amendments... relating to supervisory personnel." 145 Sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (B) relates to representatives of the employer for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining or grievance adjustment. It is only where
such representatives are also supervisors that provisions of the Act re-
lating to supervisory personnel become relevant, and then only because
the Board has placed a "permissible gloss" on that section by limiting
union discipline of such representatives.
The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that, while section
8(b) (1) (B) must not be examined in a vacuum but must be consid-
ered in light of other policy considerations imbedded in the labor law,
it is not proper to infer that Congress itself intended that interpretation
of section 8(b) (1) (B) be governed by those policies. It was the NLRB
in Oakland Mailers, and not Congress in 1947, that has made it neces-
sary to examine the effect of permitting supervisors to join unions. Be-
cause the Board has gone beyond the expressed intent of section 8(b)
(1) (B) by placing a "permissible gloss" thereon, the Board and the
courts should now feel free to b-e flexible in analyzing the conflicting
policy considerations to determine the extent of that "permissible gloss."
The policy considerations to be applied already have been discussed
in depth. It is these policies, protecting conflicting interests, which must
be reconciled to determine "what obligations a supervisor (who is also
an employer representative) owes to his union and what obligations he
owes to his employer." 146 Recapitulating, section 2 (3) places supervisors
unequivocally on the side of management in the general scheme of
labor-management relations and gives management the right to demand
their undivided loyalty. 4 7 At the same time, section 14(a) expressly
145. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,246 (emphasis supplied).
146. See note 138 supra & accompanying text.
147. See notes 16-17 supra & accompanying text.
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permits a supervisor to join a union, although his participation in union
affairs is sharply restricted by other provisions of the Act prohibiting
employer domination or interference with labor organizations.14 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized the strong interest
of unions in maintaining the loyalty of their members through enforce-
ment of rules which reflect legitimate union interests and which do not
impair other policies imbedded in the labor laws.' 49 The importance of
a union's ability to maintain a unified front during a labor dispute has
been specifically recognized.150
The application of these considerations and the questions which must
be resolved in determining the prohibited area of union discipline of
supervisors who are also representatives under section 8 (b) (1) (B) may
be framed in light of the facts presented in Illinois Bell. Did the em-
ployer, in agreeing that its supervisory personnel would be union mem-
bers, thereby voluntarily waive his right to the undivided loyalty of
those supervisors, to which he was otherwise entitled; and if so, to what
extent? Applying the considerations raised by the Supreme Court in
section 8(b) (1) (A) cases, does the union rule forbidding supervisor/
members to cross its picket lines represent a legitimate union interest;
but, even if this is conceded, does that rule, as applied to supervisor/
members, impair a policy imbedded in the labor laws? Finally, if as
may be presumed, the employer obtained a concession from the union
as consideration for its agreeing to the unionization of supervisors
through the union security clause, would it constitute an abrogation by
the employer of its part of the bargain to allow it to maintain that its
interests in retaining the loyalty of its supervisor/representatives super-
sede the union's interests in maintaining a unified front during a labor
dispute?
One other consideration might be taken into account in resolving
section 8(b) (1) (B) cases. Presumably, a supervisor would wish to re-
tain his union membership in order to maintain benefits he has accumu-
lated with the union and to preserve his seniority status should he later
return to employee status. The employer may be forced to concede to
the wishes of qualified supervisors that they be allowed to retain their
union membership. Professor Gould has suggested that if an employer
were faced with the possibility that a union could discipline supervisor/
members in a manner which the employer felt would harm its interests,
148. See notes 32-37 supra & accompanying text.
149. See note 61 supra & accompanying text.
150. See notes 53-54 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:674
UNION DISCIPLINE
the employer has an alternative. If the benefits arising from the super-
visory position were sufficiently attractive, prospective supervisors should
be willing to forego the benefits of retaining union membership. 51
Some Proposed Standards
Finally, it is necessary to suggest some precise standards which would
permit predictability in section 8(b) (1) (B) cases. if the policy consid-
erations which have been outlined are resolved relatively in favor of the
interests of management, a suitably definite standard might limit the
permissible scope of union discipline to matters mechanical in nature
which relate solely to the supervisor's relationship with the union and
to those actions of the supervisor which threaten the ability of the union
to carry out its routine business.152 Application of this standard would
clearly proscribe the discipline in Illinois Bell, but would allow discipline
for such matters as failure to pay dues, disruption of a union meeting,
or the failure to register at a local's office before obtaining work within
that local's jurisdiction.15 3
If it is found that application of section 8(b) (1) (B) should be lim-
ited, a very narrow standard would proscribe union discipline only for
acts performed by the supervisor within his responsibilities as a collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment representative, with such responsi-
bilities being interpreted narrowly.5 4 Application of this standard clearly
would require reversal of the board and panel decisions in Illinois Bell.
Another standard, which might exist in the area between those previ-
ously discussed, would prohibit union discipline of a supervisor who is
also an employer representative for acts performed while exercising
one of the supervisory authorities delineated in section 2(11)155 or
while following a clear directive of management as to a matter which
151. See Gould, supra note 134, at 1129. Professor Gould foresaw the situation which
arose in Illinois Bell and concluded that under the Allis-Cbalmers rationale, a union
should be able to discipline a supervisor/member for performing rank-and-file struck
work.
152. Any reference to internal/external union affairs as a basis for a standard is
intentionally avoided. As Judge Wright noted: "All union rules are . . . 'external' since
they are all designed to insure a strong and united front among union members when
the union confronts its employer adversary." 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 13,017, at 25,261. See
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1969).
153. See Painters Local 453, 183 NL.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970).
154. Such responsibilities interpreted narrowly would not include performing rank-
and-file struck work as was apparently suggested by the majority in Illinois Bell. See
notes 110-12 supra & accompanying text. Nor would it include the urging of employees
to vote with management as was suggested by the dissent. See notes 126-30 supra &
accompanying text.
155. See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
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can be asserted in good faith to be within management's prerogative
under the collective bargaining agreement. The discipline in Illinois
Bell would be permissible under this standard, since performing rank-
and-file work does not involve exercise of any of the 2 (11) authorities
and since there was no clear directive from the employer to report for
work. Moreover, it could be argued that the inclusion of supervisors
in the union security clause negates any management prerogative to have
its supervisors perform rank-and-file struck work. This final standard
would, however, support the decision in Meat Cutters, if the change of
meat procurement policy involved in that case could be asserted in
good faith as a matter of management prerogative under the collective
bargaining agreement.
CONCLUSION
Section 8(b) (1) (B) was intended by Congress to protect an em-
ployer from union interference in the selection of his collective bar-
gaining and grievance adjustment representatives. It was not intended
to be used to determine whether a union could discipline a supervisor
whom the employer had permitted to become or remain a union mem-
ber. In holding that union discipline of a supervisor who is also an em-
ployer representative could force a substitution of his loyalties and be
an effective impediment to the employer's free choice of its collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives, the NLRB went
beyond the language of the statute in order to effectuate the purpose of
section 8 (b) (1) (B). Congress permitted supervisors to join unions if
an employer should so agree, but it gave no basis for determining what
effect union membership of a supervisor should have on the undivided
loyalty an employer is otherwise entitled to demand of such a super-
visor. Because of an administrative determination, it is now necessary
that the courts apply conflicting policy considerations flexibly in order
to reach a reasonable resolution of the question.
In the five years since the Board's decision in Oakland Mailers, the
Board and the courts have managed to create a confusing jungle of
imprecise terminology and careless analysis. While other courts have
summarily affirmed decisions of the Board, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has at least made an effort to determine the
limits of application of section 8 (b) (1) (B) to union discipline of super-
visors who are also employer representatives. The full court, on re-
hearing in Illinois Bell, is presented with an excellent opportunity to
examine the policy considerations and set meaningful standards for
resolution of section 8(b) (1) (B) cases.
